Labor and Employment by Parker, Raymond




West Virginia University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Survey of Developments in West Virginia Law: 1984 is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For
more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Recommended Citation




Blake v. Civil Service Commission., 310 S.E.2d 472 (W. Va. 1983).
McDonald v. Young, 313 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1984).
Orteza v. Monongalia County General Hospital, 318 S.E.2d 40 (W. Va. 1984).
Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., No. CC937 (W. Va. July 13, 1984).
Traditionally, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has demonstrated
two purposes in its treatment of cases regarding employee dismissals: to protect
the constitutional due process rights' of public employees, and to insure that private
employees will have recourse for dismissals which are contrary to public policy.
Additionally, those employees under the purview of the West Virginia Civil Service
Commission can only be dismissed on a showing of good cause. The cases reviewed
during the survey period demonstrate a continuation of this traditional treatment.
In Blake v. Civil Service Commission,' the court reviewed findings of the West
Virginia Civil Service Commission to determine whether the petitioners' miscon-
duct was so serious as to warrant their dismissal. Two employees at the Weston
State Hospital were accused of taking clothing donated for patients. After an inter-
nal investigation, the employees returned the items and explained that they took
the clothing to give to the patients as Christmas presents. After a ten-day suspen-
sion, the hospital officials decided to dismiss them. The employees appealed the
decision to the West Virginia Civil Service Commission which upheld the dismissals,
finding that good cause had been shown, that procedural due process requirements
had been met, and that the suspensions and dismissals were not duplicative
punishments. On appeal, the court reversed their dismissals, finding that good cause
had not been shown. 3
The court stated the general rule that a finding of fact by the Civil Service
Commission will not be reversed unless it is clearly wrong, but that a final order
will be reversed if it is not supported by, or is contrary to, the evidence, or if it is
based on a mistake of law. 4 Viewing the determination of good cause as a question
of law,' the court independently reviewed the facts of the case and held that "petty
theft of clothing donated for hospital patients is worthy of discipline, but it does
not constitute good cause for dismissal." 6
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 10. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Blake v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 310 S.E.2d 472 (XV. Va. 1983).
3Id.
4 Id. at 473 (citing Vosberg v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 275 S.E.2d 640 (W. Va. 1981).
1 Id. at 473 (citing syllabus point one of Oakes v. West Virginia Dep't of Finance and Admin.,
264 S.E.2d 151 (,V. Va. 1981). The court repeated:
W. Va. Code, 29-6-15, requires that the dismissal of a civil service employee be for good
cause, which means misconduct of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests
of the public, rather than upon trivial or inconsequential matters, or mere technical viola-
tions of statute or official duty without wrongful intention.
6 Blake, 310 S.E.2d at 473-74.
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The court was more restrained in reviewing the facts presented by McDonald
v. Young." Deputy McDonald was ordered by his sheriff to obtain the required
certification for law enforcement officers by attending the police academy. The
deputy left the academy after only six hours, having decided that he had taken
the necessary courses and had much more experience and education than the others
there. Without speaking to his sheriff, the deputy used the remaining time allotted
for training as vacation. Subsequently, the sheriff sent McDonald a notice of intent
to discharge, and the deputy requested a public hearing before the Civil Service
Commission. The Commission later ruled that the dismissal was justified. McDonald
appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the Commission's decision. The court
found that the Commission acted improperly by not making findings of fact, by
not recognizing that the deputy had not received proper notice of the specific regula-
tions which he violated, and by not demonstrating legally sufficient good cause.
On appeal, the supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Harshbarger, held that
a deputy sheriff's disobedience of a lawful order from a superior officer to under-
take training constitutes gross misconduct warranting dismissal. The court
admonished the Civil Service Commission to articulate findings of fact in their
orders so that the parties and reviewing courts will know the basis of their deci-
sions. It found that McDonald's failure to obey the order was flagrant, undisputed,
and a sufficient cause for dismissal. Furthermore, although McDonald did not have
formal notice of the rule under which he was discharged, the court held that there
was no doubt that the deputy knew he was obliged to follow lawful orders of the
sheriff. To remove the potential for due process or lack-of-notice attacks, the court
recommended in dictum that all public employees should be given a copy of rules
and regulations by which they are governed. Overlooking the minor errors of the
Commission, the court reiterated its rule that substantial compliance with procedures
may be sufficient to uphold a discharge.
Orteza v. Monongalia General Hospital' presented the court with still another
employee dismissal controversy, but the issues were substantially more complex.
The most interesting aspect of the case centered around a determination of whether
the defendant hospital was an instrumentality of the state. A finding of "state
action" would, of course, afford the plaintiff constitutional due process protection.
Josefina Orteza, a physician, was on the staff of Monongalia General Hospital.
Her employment contract with the hospital provided that either party could ter-
minate the agreement by giving one hundred twenty days written notice. The con-
tract also contained a grievance procedure for resolving disputes between Dr. Orteza
and the hospital over administrative or medical matters. The reasons given by the
hospital for Dr. Orteza's termination were entirely administrative. Dr. Orteza sued
McDonald v. Young, 313 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1984).
Id. at 448 (citing Bones v. West Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 163 W. Va. 253, 255 S.E.2d
219 (W. Va. 1979)).
1Orteza v. Monongalia Gen. Hosp., 318 S.E.2d 40 (W. Va. 1984).
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claiming her discharge was unlawful based on two theories. She asserted that she
had been denied due process under the federal and state constitutions and that
the contract had been breached. The circuit court directed a verdict on the due
process claim and submitted the contract claim to the jury, which returned a general
verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
Writing for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Justice Neely quickly
dispensed with the breach of contract claim. He reaffirmed the rule that contract
interpretation is a function of the court and not the jury.'0 Where the terms of
the contract are clear and unambiguous there is no room for construction and the
court must apply the terms as written." The court noted that "agreements are not
necessarily ambiguous because the parties disagree as to the meaning of the language
of the agreement."'' 2 The bulk of the opinion was devoted to a discussion of whether
the hospital's action constituted "state action" and whether due process rights were
afforded to the plaintiff. The court reviewed both the public and private attributes
of Monongalia General Hospital and noted the difficulty in characterizing the
institution as wholly public or private for purposes of determining due process pro-
tection. Instead, the court looked at the level of state involvement in the specific
action that is the basis of the dispute.
The court continued its analysis by noting that recent case law indicated a general
trend away from finding state action in cases where private institutions rely on
public funds.' 3 For instance, in Blum v. Yaretsky," Justice Rehnquist pointed to
three requirements for finding state action: (1) a sufficiently close nexus between
the conduct of the regulated private entity and the state; (2) the exercise of coercive
power or significant encouragement by the state which led the private entity to
act in the challenged manner; and (3) a private entity exercising powers that are
"traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state."'" Similarly, in Modaber v.
Culpeper Memorial Hospital, Inc.,'6 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held "that
a hospital was involved in state action only when it acted (1) in an exclusively state
capacity; (2) for the state's direct benefit; or (3) at the state's specific behest.""
Viewing the record before it, the court in the instant case found no nexus between
the state and the hospital's personnel decision. However, for purposes of argu-
ment, the court assumed the hospital was a public agency and proceeded to con-
sider the property and liberty interest of the plaintiff.
:0 Id. at 42 (citing Stephens v. Bartlett, 118 W.Va. 421, 191 S.E. 550 (W. Va. 1937)).
Id. at 42 (citing Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Haden, 172 S.E.2d 126 (W. Va. 1969)).
Id. at 43 (citing Richardson v. Econo-Travel Motor Hotel Corp., 553 F. Supp. 320, 323 (E.D.
Va. 1982)).
11 Id. at 45 (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991 (1982)).
14 Blum, 457 U.S. 991.
11 Id. at 1011.
16 Modaber v. Culpeper Memorial Hosp., 674 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1982).
11 Id. at 1025.
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The property interest the plaintiff claimed she was deprived of arose under
the contract; however, the contract was terminable at will upon one hundred twenty
days written notice. Because the plaintiff had no more than a unilateral expecta-
tion of continued employment, the court found no protectable property interest.
The court also found the manner of the dismissal in no way besmirched the
plaintiff's personal or professional reputation nor was there any deprivation of
Orteza's ability to pursue her lawful occupation. The court noted that the plaintiff
was a licensed medical doctor and that there existed considerable demand for her
professional medical services in the private sector. Furthermore, although it was
not required by her contract, the hospital afforded Dr. Orteza opportunities to
use both the administrative and medical grievance procedures to challenge her
discharge. In both of these hearings, it was found that the reasons for Dr. Orteza's
termination were administrative only. Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff
was not deprived of any liberty interest by the hospital's action.
Justice Neely's discussion of the "state action" issue is the most significant
aspect of the Orteza decision. Ironically, however, the court assumed "state ac-
tion" and thereby rendered its argument dicta. Thus, what the court purported
to provide was a useful framework of the relevant factors which practitioners will
want to focus on when faced with this issue. Whether Justice Neely's discussion
of "state action" truly represents guidance to practitioners will depend on the ex-
tent to which the remaining justices will be committed to the rationale underlying
the analysis.
In Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp.,'8 the court was asked to determine
if the dismissal of twb motel employees for refusing to take polygraph tests was
contrary to the public policy of West Virginia. Reaffirming that a legally protected
interest in privacy is recognized in this state,' 9 the court found that the dismissal
of employees for refusing to take a polygraph test was contrary to public policy.
The relevant facts in Cordle can be briefly summarized. The plaintiffs were
maids at the defendant's motel. After reluctantly signing an agreement to take a
polygraph test, the plaintiffs later refused to actually submit to the test. Subse-
quently, the defendant employer notified the employees by letter that their employ-
ment was terminated for failing to take the polygraph test as earlier agreed. The
" Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., No. CC937 (NV. Va. July 13, 1984).
" See Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958), where the plaintiff maintained
an action for "intrusion of privacy" against a landlord who had installed listening devices in her apart-
ment. See also Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d 716 (1959). The Sutherland
court recognized a violation of the plaintiff's privacy based on trespass where a store employee searched
a bag carried into the store by the plaintiff. Finally, see Golden v. Board of Educ., 285 S.E.2d 665
(W. Va. 1981), where the court reinstated a teacher dismissed for "immorality" where the alleged im-
moral conduct had no impact upon the teacher's fitness to teach or upon the school community.
1985]
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employees challenged the dismissals in the circuit court, which denied the employer's
motion to dismiss and certified two questions to the supreme court: First, whether
the termination of the maids' employment for refusing to take the polygraph exam
violated the public policy of the State; and second, whether this determination was
a question of fact for a jury or a question of law for the court.
Writing for a narrow majority, Justice McHugh summarily answered the second
question by stating that the determination of public policy is a question of law
for the court." Neither party had contested that issue, and the balance of the opinion
was devoted to a discussion of the substantive public policy considerations. In its
analysis, the court took notice of recent state legislation2' which placed substantial
limitations on employers' use of polygraph testing on their employees. Since this
legislation was promulgated subsequent to the plaintiffs' termination, it was held
not to be dispositive of the question raised; however, the court perceived the statute
to be the embodiment of a "recognized facet of public policy" 22 in this state. The
court relied on its holding in Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont23 that
an employer's right to discharge an "at will" employee does not extend to situa-
tions where the employer's motivation for the discharge 'is to contravene some
substantial public policy principle. Applying the Harless rationale, the court held
"that it is contrary to the public policy of West Virginia for an employer to require
or request an employee to submit to a polygraph test or similar test as a condition
of employment." 24 However, the court noted an important qualification to this
holding': consistent with West Virginia qde section 21-5-5b,2 under some cir-
cumstances polygraph tests may be used when other important public-policy con-
siderations provide justification.
20 Cordle, No. CC937, slip op. at 7.
2W W. Va. Code § 21-5-5b (Supp. 1984) provides as follows:
No employer may require or request either directly or indirectly, that any employee or
prospective employee of such employer submit to a polygraph, lie detector or other such
similar test utilizing mechanical measures of physiological reactions to evaluate truthfulness,
and no employer may knowingly allow the results of any such examination or test administered
outside this State to be utilized for the purpose of determining whether to employ a prospec-
tive employee or to continue the employment of an employee in this State: Provided, that
the provisions of this section shall not apply to employees of an employer authorized to
manufacture, distribute or dispense the drugs to which article five [§ 30-5-1 et seq.], chapter
thirty applies, excluding ordinary drugs as defined in section twenty-one [§ 30-5-21], article
five, chapter thirty: Provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not apply
to law enforcement agencies or to military forces of the State as defined by section one [§
15-1-1], article one, chapter fifteen of the Code: Provided, further, that the results of any
such examination shall be used solely for the purpose of determining whether to employ or
to continue to employ any person exempted hereunder and for no other purpose.
22 Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1365 (3d Cir. 1979).
23 Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (f. Va. 1978).
2, Cordle, No. CC937, slip op. at 14.
25 See supra note 21.
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II. TENuRE
Orr v. Crowder, 315 S.E.2d 593 (W. Va. 1984).
State ex rel. Norton v. Stone, 313 S.E.2d 456 (W. Va. 1984).
The constitutional issues raised in the wrongful dismissal cases surfaced in the
wrongful denial of tenure cases reviewed during the survey period. The court
analyzed due process considerations as they applied to employees of two colleges.
In Orr v. Crowder,2 6 a librarian at West Liberty State College was given a
one-year terminal contract after having been employed for the previous five years
under one-year contracts. Ms. Orr contended that she had acquired tenure rights,
arising from prior oral agreements made with the defendants, and therefore she
was entitled to the procedural protections afforded to dismissed tenured faculty
members. Furthermore, the librarian argued that she was given the terminal con-
tract as a result of her criticism of proposed plans for remodeling the college's
library. Ms. Orr brought the action under 42 U.S.C. section 198327 claiming that
defendants violated her procedural due process rights and free speech rights under
the Constitution. On appeal, the defendants argued that, as a matter of law, the
trial court erred in refusing to grant the defendants' motion for a directed verdict.
Writing for the majority, Justice Miller first considered Ms. Orr's claim of
deprivation of procedural due process. The court noted that in a prior case, State
ex rel. MeLendon v. Morton,"8 it stated that a teacher who had satisfied the objec-
tive eligibility standards for tenure could not be denied tenure without some pro-
cedural due process. However, in Orr, the court disagreed with the librarian that
she had satisfied those objective eligibility standards. The court found that the
evidence indicated a lack of any formal policy governing even the faculty status
of librarians. Moreover, the court stated "that before a protected property interest,
such as the right to tenure, can be found, something more than a unilateral expec-
tation must be shown. Plaintiff[s] must demonstrate that there existed some rules
or understandings governing tenure eligibility fostered by the college upon which
the college employees relied." 9 Since there was no showing of any general under-
standing or rule with respect to retroactive faculty status, Ms. Orr's procedural
due process claim failed as a matter of law.
26 Orr v. Crowder, 315 S.E.2d 593 (f. Va. 1983).
21 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable
to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
28 State ex rel. McLendon v. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919 fV. Va. 1978).
29 Orr, 315 S.E.2d at 600.
19851
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In addressing the plaintiff's first amendment claim, the court reviewed the rele-
vant facts. Shortly before the librarian had received her terminal contract, she had
publicly criticized the defendants' proposed plan for remodeling the library. As
a result, the previously good working relationship between the librarian and the
defendants rapidly deteriorated. The court then applied these facts to the standards
established under Pickering v. Board of Education,30 where the United States
Supreme Court held that public employees are protected from firings resulting from
the exercise of free speech rights. Under Pickering, however, that right is not absolute
and must be balanced with the state's interest in efficient and orderly operation
of its affairs. Recognizing that Ms. Orr's comments concerned a matter of public
interest, the design of the college library, the court deemed that the Pickering stan-
dard weighed in favor of the plaintiff.
In deciding whether Ms. Orr's comments were a substantial factor in motivating
the defendants' decision to give her a terminal contract, the court once again turned
to the guidance of the Supreme Court. Mount Healthy City School District Board
of Education v. Doyle3 allocated the evidentiary burdens among parties in a first
amendment claim. The plaintiff must show that her protected conduct was the
motivating factor in the dismissal; the defendant can refute this showing by per-
suading the court it would have terminated the plaintiff in the absence of the pro-
tected conduct. Applying this to the facts of the case, the court believed that Ms.
Orr had shown by a preponderance of evidence that her criticism of the remodeling
plans was a substantial or motivating factor for the terminal contract. The court
was clear in pointing out that a plaintiff need not show that the exercise of first
amendment rights was the "sole" factor precipitating the terminal contract.
However, if the employee has carried that burden, the employer may show by a
preponderance of evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to the
plaintiff's reemployment even in the absence of the protected speech. Furthermore,
whether the employee has shown a sufficient connection between the claimed viola-
tion of first amendment rights and the ultimate discharge, or whether the employer
has rebutted that charge, must be determined with reference to "the employee's
job performance considered in its entirety."3 Tested by these standards, the evidence
demonstrated that the defendant's actions substantially deprived Ms. Orr of her
first amendment guarantees. The court upheld the jury's verdict awarding $26,400.00
in damages and $10,405.75 in attorney's fees.
Although not raised by either party in the case, the court perceived an interesting
question that arose from its finding that only one of the librarian's two theories
of recovery should be upheld. The court addressed sua sponte the question of
"whether a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff can stand where one of the
two theories of recovery, i.e., the violation of her procedural due process rights,
30 Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township High School Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
" Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
Mazaleski v. Trusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 87
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has been found to be insufficient as a matter of law." This question, sometimes
referred to as the two-issue rule, was one of first impression for the court. Recogniz-
ing that there is a split of authority on this point, the court reviewed numerous
cases from other jurisdictions and cases within our state on related questions and
held:
[Tihat where a jury returns a general verdict in a case involving two or more liability
issues and its verdict is supported by the evidence on at least one issue, the verdict
will not be reversed, unless the defendant has requested and been refused the right
to have the jury make special findings as to his liability on each of the issues. 3
Finally, in response to the defendant's claim that the librarian's damage recovery
should be reduced by the amount of unemployment benefits she received, the court
indicated that the collateral source rule would operate in this instance to preclude
the offsetting of any such benefits. Drawing an analogy to workers' compensation
benefits, the court cited Jones v. Laird Foundation, Inc.," where it held that under
the collateral source rule, such benefits could not be used to reduce an award of
damages.
In the second tenure denial case during the survey period, the petitioner in
Norton v. Stone"s unsuccessfully brought an original proceeding in mandamus to
compel an award of tenure. Although procedural due process claims comprised
the crux of the petitioner's objections, they were subsumed within the mandamus
application. The court unequivocally rejected the claim that tenure should be awarded
by a writ of mandamus. In Norton, the petitioner was in his fifth year as chairman
of the Department of Sociology and Public Service at West Liberty State College
and had applied for tenure. The evaluation process provided for tenure to be awarded
by action of the president of the college following the review of the recommenda-
tions submitted by a faculty committee and the academic officers of the college.
Copies of these recommendations were to be given to the faculty members seeking
tenure. In addition to these recommendations, however, the president considered
sixteen unsolicited letters disparaging Dr. Norton's suitability for tenure, without
providing the professor an opportunity to respond. After tenure was denied and
Dr. Norton was offered a one year terminal contract, he appealed to the Board
of Regents. The Board appointed a hearing examiner to review the decision. The
examiner concluded that the president's actions effectively denied Norton due process
and awarded him an additional year of employment, during which he should be
properly reevaluated for tenure. Instead of appealing the hearing examiner's deci-
sion to the Board of Regents, Dr. Norton brought an original proceeding in
mandamus.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Neely stated that based on the factual
" Orr, 315 S.E.2d at 608.
Jones v. Laird Found., Inc., 156 W. Va. 479, 195 S.E.2d 821 (1973).
" Norton v. Stone, 313 S.E.2d 456 (-V. Va. 1984).
1985]
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circumstances presented, issuance of a writ of mandamus would be inappropriate."
Further, to the extent that the president's decision to deny tenure was based on
consideration of the negative letters, to which the petitioner had no opportunity
to respond, that decision could be considered arbitrary, capricious or unsupported
by the evidence. In so doing, the court approved the hearing examiner's decision
and held that under these circumstances the petitioner's "proper remedy is an award
of an additional non-terminal year of employment during which the faculty member
must be afforded a proper evaluation.""
III. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Butcher v. State Workers' Compensation Commissioner, 315 S.E.2d 563 (W. Va.
1983).
Allen v. Workers' Compensation Commissioner, 314 S.E.2d 401 (W. Va. 1984).
Wilson v. Workers' Compensation Commissioner, No. 15990 (W. Va. March 29,
1984).
The principle that the workers' compensation statutes should be liberally con-
strued in favor of the claimants to fulfill the statutes' remedial objective 31 underlies
the court's analysis of workers' compensation statutes. A practical reason for the
court's "liberality rule" stems from an appreciation of the inefficiency of the office
of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner which is often evidenced in its deci-
sionmaking process.39 Thus, the court continues to vigorously protect the claimants,
arguably at the expense of the employer. This was illustrated in Butcher v. State
Workers' Compensation Commissioner,4 where the court addressed the question
of whether a statutory repayment provision, West Virginia Code section 23-4-ic, 4'
applies only when the employer has first made a timely protest to the initial award
of temporary total disability.
11 "A writ of mandamus will not issue unless three elements coexist-l) a clear legal right in
the petitioner to the relief sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of the respondent to do the thing which
the petitioner seeks to compel; and (3) the absence of another adequate remedy." McGrady v. Callaghan,
161 W. Va. 180, 244 S.E.2d 793 (1978) (syllabus point two).
3' Norton, 313 S.E.2d 456 (syllabus point one).
" W. VA. CODE §§ 23-1-I to -23 (1981 & Supp. 1984). "Workmen's compensation statutes, being
remedial, should be liberally construed in favor of [the] claimants for workmen's compensation benefits."
Johnson v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 624, 186 S.E.2d 771 (1972) (syllabus
point one).
" See Survey of Developments in West Virginia Law-Administrative Law: 1983, 86 W. VA.
L. REv. 481 (1983-84) (citing Interim Comm. Hrgs. Before the House Gov't Operations Comm. (June
13, 1983) (report of the Legislative Auditor's Office)).
,0 Butcher v. State Workers Compensation Comm'r, 315 S.E.2d 563 (W. Va. 1983).
4 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1c (1981) provides, in relevant part:
In the event that an employer files a timely objection to any finding or order of the commis-
sioner, as provided in section one [§ 23-5-1], article five of this chapter, with respect to the
payment or continued payment of temporary total disability benefits . . . the commissioner
shall continue to pay to the claimant such benefits and expenses during the period of such
disability unless it is subsequently found by the commissioner that the claimant was not entitled
[Vol. 87
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Jimmy Lee Butcher sustained an injury to his right knee in the course of employ-
ment as a coal miner. The Commissioner held his claim to be compensable and,
based upon the treating physician's estimate of how long the disability would last,
awarded him four weeks of total temporary disability benefits. The employer did
not protest this initial award. Subsequently, however, the employer did protest three
separate orders by the Commissioner which extended the award of temporary total
disability benefits. The Commissioner granted these additional awards based upon
estimates made by the treating physician of the period of total temporary disability.
Twice, the Commissioner scheduled hearings on the employer's protest of extended
benefits but the claimant did not appear at either hearing and failed to provide
a "good cause" explanation for his second nonappearance. 2 The Commissioner
then held that the protested benefits were overpayments and, therefore, subject
to collection from the claimant. After the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed
the Commissioner's decision, the claimant appealed to the supreme court.
Writing for the majority, Justice Miller reversed the Commissioner's decision
because it did not comport with the statutory requirements of the Act or the prior
decisions of the court. Specifically, the court found the procedures followed by
the Commissioner to be erroneous in light of Mitchell v. State Workmen's Com-
pensation Commissioner.13 In "clarifying" Mitchell, the court's decision has added
a gloss to our state's workers' compensation laws.
Applying the court's rationale in Mitchell to the facts in Butcher, the court
held that it was inappropriate for the Commissioner to have granted the employer's
request for an evidentiary hearing to protest the award extending the claimant's
benefits. Instead, the court stated that the employer should have filed a petition
for modification, pursuant to West Virginia Code section 23-5-1c." Under this sec-
to receive the temporary total disability benefits and the expenses .. . in which event the
commissioner shall . . . credit said employer's account with the amount of the overpayment.
... If the final decision in any case determines that a claimant was not lawfully entitled
to benefits paid to him pursuant to a prior decision, such amount of benefits so paid shall
be deemed overpaid. The commissioner may recover such amounts by civil action or...
shall withhold, in whole or in part, as determined by the commissioner, any future benefits
payable to the individual and credit such amount against the overpayment until it is repaid
in full.
42 After each nonappearance at a scheduled hearing, the commissioner sends a "fifteen-day" letter,
which indicates that the nonappearing party has fifteen days to provide a "good cause" explanation
for his nonappearance.
" Mitchell v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 163 W. Va. 107, 256 S.E.2d 1 (1979).
" W. VA. CODE § 23-5-ic (1981) provides:
In any case wherein an employer makes application in writing for modification of any award
previously made to an employee of said employer, and such application discloses cause for
a further adjustment thereof, the commissioner shall, after due notice to the employer, make
such modifications or changes with respect to former findings or orders in such form as
may be justified, and any party dissatisfied with any such modification or change so made
by the commissioner shall, upon proper and timely objection, be entitled to a hearing as
provided in section one [§ 23-5-11 of this article.
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tion, the Commissioner may, based upon credible evidence, terminate a claimant's
extended benefits, after having first given the claimant an opportunity to provide
additional supporting evidence. Furthermore, evidentiary hearings are not to be
held by the Commissioner until a timely objection is made to the order terminating
or continuing the extended benefits. Should the Commissioner decide to terminate
benefits, the proper date for termination is the date of the Commissioner's ter-
mination order. Thus, in no way may the employer seek repayment of benefits
pursuant to a petition for modification (West Virginia Code section 23-5-1c) because
the payments are effectively deemed proper until the termination order is entered.
It is only when the employer protests the initial award of temporary total disabil-
ity, by challenging its jurisdictional basis"' within thirty days of the award, that
he can invoke the repayment provisions of West Virginia Code section 23-4-1 c4
by proving that the claimant was not lawfully entitled to benefits initially.
Justice Neely, dissenting,"7 claimed essentially that rather than clarifying Mit-
chell, the majority perverted the meaning of the Act. The crux of the majority's
argument in Butcher as well as in Mitchell turned on the use of the terms "jurisdic-
tional" and "medical" to distinguish between initial and extended awards of total
temporary disability. To the extent that some explanation of these "talismanic" 4
terms is needed, it is submitted that "jurisdictional" refers to the kind of injury
(that is, an injury sustained in the course of employment versus an injury sustained
outside of employment), while "medical" refers to the degree of injury (that is,
whether or not a claimant's compensable injury has reached its maximum degree
of improvement). The majority indicated that once a claimant jurisdictionally
qualifies, constitutional due process prevents retroactive termination of total tem-
porary disability benefits. 9 To this, the dissent responded by claiming that an
interpretation of the Act which forces an employer to pay extended benefits which
may be ultimately found improper ignored the plain meaning of the statutory
language and "is blatantly inequitable."5 0
Although one might conclude that Butcher effectively required an employer
to make spurious jurisdictional protests in order to reserve the right to later make
a proper medical protest, the court's holding in Mitchell," clearly indicated that
only when the Commissioner determined that a claimant was not initially entitled
to benefits can the repayment provisions under West Virginia Code section 24-4-1c
apply. The court in Butcher effectively restated its policy of liberality. In an effort
to streamline the inefficiencies inherent in the workers' compensation decisionmaking
" The initial decision granting or denying temporary total disability can be challenged by either
party by requesting an evidentiary hearing on the issue of compensability under W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1.
46 See supra note 41.
,1 Butcher, 315 S.E.2d at 572 (Neely, J., dissenting).
4I Id. at 573.
,1 Id. at 563.
SO Id. at 572 (Neely, J., dissenting).
11 Mitchell, 256 S.E.2d at 13.
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process, once a claimant jurisdictionally qualifies for total temporary disability
benefits, the only issue contestable by the employer is the date upon which he can
cease paying benefits.
The court's mission in the Butcher case, to clarify the workers' compensation
statutes, continued in Allen v. Workers' Compensation Commissioner.5 Ostensibly,
the question raised in Allen involved the application of procedural due process
requirements recognized in Mitchell. The more important aspect of Allen, however,
may be the court's imprimatur to the concept of interim employment by the claimant
during the period of total temporary disability. Specifically, the court addressed
the issue of whether the Commissioner must provide to a claimant who is engaged
in interim employment advance notice of the reasons his employer seeks modifica-
tion in benefits, even though the Commissioner finds no cause for modification.
Richard P. Allen had twice injured his back while working in a coal mine.
After receiving six months of total temporary disability benefits, his claim was closed
for lack of medical evidence. Nearly six months later, Allen petitioned the Com-
missioner to reopen his claim and was granted an additional six months of benefits
on the basis of a doctor's report. To this final award, his employer protested the
reopening of the claim and filed a petition for modification3.5  In this bifurcated
process, the employer's petition for modification had been denied, and while an
appeal of that decision was pending, a hearing was held on the employer's protest
to the reopening of the claim. The employer supported his petition for modifica-
tion with a detective's report, which indicated that Allen had purchased a restaurant
and was operating it on a full-time basis. Allen was questioned regarding the
substance of this report at the protest hearing, but not until the appeal hearing
on the denied petition for modification did Allen have formal notice of the detec-
tive's report."' It was on the basis of the detective's report that the Appeal Board
found just cause for modification, thereby reversing the Commissioner's prior
decision.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the Appeal Board's decision, holding
that "Allen's due process rights were denied when he was not notified about the
modification application and its supporting documents. '" 5 Justice Harshbarger,
,2 Allen v. Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 314 S.E.2d 401 (W. Va. 1984).
" As discussed above (see supra notes 41 and 45, the employer may request a hearing under
W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1 to challenge the issue of the compensability of the claimant's injury on jurisdic-
tional grounds. At the same time, the employer may petition for modification under W. VA. CODE
§ 23-5-1c to challenge the medical basis of the period for which benefits have been awarded. The employer's
purpose in pursuing both of these procedures concurrently is to terminate benefits on a medical basis
until he can challenge their jurisdictional basis, assuming he contends impropriety on both bases.
,4 In reviewing a petition for modification under W. VA. CODE § 23-5-1c, the Commissioner need
not provide notice to a claimant unless he finds good cause for adjustment. See supra note 44. Since
the Commissioner denied the employer's petition, Allen's first formal notice of the petition for modification
came after the employer requested an appeal hearing under W. VA. CODE § 23-5-id.
55 Allen, 314 S.E.2d at 404.
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writing for the majority, explained that in addition to the notice requirements of
West Virginia Code section 23-5-1c, the court's prior holding in Mitchell requires
"that the Commissioner give the claimant advance notification of the reasons why
his temporary total disability benefits are being considered for termination and a
reasonable opportunity to supply the relevant information on the issue, except where
the claimant has voluntarily returned to work." 6 In rejecting the employer's con-
tention that the requirements of Mitchell do not apply since Allen had "voluntarily
returned to work," the court circumscribed the "Mitchell exception" by stating
that it "is for the clear cut case where the claimant returned to full-time work
at his same job for the same employer." '5 7 Finally, in providing additional guidance
to the Commissioner as to when a claimant "returns to work," the court stated
the following definition of temporary total disability: An "inability to return to
substantially gainful employment requiring skills or activities comparable to those
of one's previous gainful employment during the healing or recovery period after
injury." 58
The procedural protection which Allen crystallizes for the workers' compensa-
tion claimant is not without its cost. As Justice Neely noted in dissent, "there is
no such thing as a minor adjustment ' 59 when dealing with a bureaucracy of mam-
moth proportions.6" Realistically, could it be said that Allen was without notice
that his owning and operating a restaurant would be an issue at the hearing before
the Appeal Board, especially since he had answered several questions related to
that issue at the protest hearing? Under these circumstances, was Allen not given
the process he was due? The Workers' Compensation Fund is an entitlement pro-
gram; indeed, its provisions should be liberally construed in favor of the claimant.
Where, however, should the line be drawn?
Implicit within the court's discussion in Allen is an approval of interim employ-
ment during the temporary total disability healing period. Moreover, Allen can
be read as encouraging interim employment: "A claimant who seeks' alternative
employment during his healing period before he is medically certified to return
to work or has reached his maximum level of improvement, should not be
penalized."'" Admittedly, the court's emphasis in Allen is to protect claimants'
due process rights, but by encouraging "totally disabled" claimants to engage in
employment during the healing period, the court may have stretched the "remedial
objectives" of the Act. The Allen decision creates some interesting questions; for
example, if the claimant engages in interim employment while receiving temporary
total disability benefits and thereby aggravates his injury, may the employer con-
test subsequent extensions of benefits on a jurisdictional basis? In Wilson v. Workers'
1, Id. at 403-04 (citing Mitchell 256 S.E.2d 1 (syllabus point one) (emphasis in the original)).
1, Id. at 406.
11 Id. at 405.
I d. at 406 (Neely, J., dissenting).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 405.
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Compensation Commissioner,62 the court addressed a similar question and gave
an interesting answer.
In Wilson, the important question addressed by the court was twofold: When
a claimant suffers a subsequent progression of aggravation of a compensable injury,
what procedures should govern his petition to reopen the claim; and, what stan-
dards should be applied in determining the compensability of subsequent progres-
sions or aggravations flowing from the original injury? On its own -motion, the
court in Wilson consolidated three cases which contained similar legal issues but
differed strikingly in their factual circumstances.
In Wilson, each claimant filed a petition 63 and was awarded additional tem-
porary total disability benefits. The employers objected to the awards and, after
hearings, the claimants were ordered to repay the benefits under West Virginia Code
section 23-4-1c. The factual dissimilarity among the claimants lies in the cause of
their aggravated injuries. To briefly summarize, claimant Wilson's injury was ag-
gravated by playing with his child, while claimant Cook aggravated her injury when
she was involved in an automobile accident, and, finally, claimant Jeffrey contended
that a bone spur on his left ankle resulted from his initial injury, a sprained right
ankle.
The wealth of protection which Mitchell64 provides the claimant is great, but
not endless, for the court rejected the contention that Mitchell barred the Commis-
sioner from either granting the employer a protest hearing or ordering the claimants
to repay benefits. Since the claimants must produce new evidence in order to reopen
a claim, 63 fairness dictates that the employer have an opportunity to challenge that
evidence. Thus, an employer's decision not to contest an initial award of temporary
total disability does not preclude the employer from contesting a subsequent
application to reopen under West Virginia Code section 23-5-1a. In this ruling,
however, the court clearly excluded those situations where, although the claimant's
disability continues, his benefits have been discontinued due to a mere hiatus in
his doctor's filing of medical reports.66
In formulating a standard to determine the compensability of subsequent pro-
" Wilson v. Workers' Compensation Comm'r, No. 15990 (W. Va. March 29, 1984).
63 The claimants petitioned for the reopening of their claims under W. VA. CODE § 23-5-la (1976).
This section provides in part: "any party dissatisfied with any . . . change so made by the commis-
sioner shall, upon proper and timely objection, be entitled to a hearing, as provided in section one
[§ 23-5-1] of this article."
64 Mitchell, 256 S.E.2d 1.
65 For the purposes of obtaining a reopening of a Workmen's Compensation claim under the
provisions of W. VA. CODE, 23-5-la and -lb, the claimant must show a prima facie cause,
which means nothing more than any evidence which would tend to justify, but not compel,
the inference that there has been a progression or aggravation of the former injury.
Harper v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 160 W. Va. 364, 234 S.E.2d 779 (1977) (syllabus
point one).
6 Wilson, No. 15990, slip op. at n.4.
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gressions or aggravations which flow from an initial injury, the court relied, in
part, upon the teachings of Professor Larson.67 Larson recognizes that every natural
consequence which flows from an initially compensable injury is likewise com-
pensable but excludes an injury which results from "an independent intervening
cause attributable to the claimant's own intentional conduct."' 8 Using this state-
ment as a base, the court molded a less restrictive standard in holding:
If a workers' compensation claimant shows that he received an initial injury which
arose out of and in the course of his employment, then every normal consequence
that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment. If, however, a
subsequent aggravation of the initial injury arises from an independent intervening
cause not attributable to the claimant's customary activity in light of his condition,
then such aggravation is not compensable.1 9
Illustrating what kinds of activities may be customary in light of the condition,
the court cited cases from other jurisdictions in which benefit claims were reopened
after the claimant reinjured his back by lifting boxes 70 and pipe7' while at home.
Applying the standard to the claimants in the present case, the court held that an
aggravation caused by playing with one's child (Wilson) is compensable, but that
an aggravation caused by an automobile accident (Cook) is not compensable. 2
The difficulty with the Wilson standard lies in its lack of precision and its sub-
jective nature. Further, the striking factual differences among the claimants in Wilson
provided no real test of the standard adopted. Indeed, the line drawn by the cqurt
is hard to apply. For example, given that chopping wood is certainly customary
for many, under what conditions would the court find this activity objectionable?
It cannot be argued that the temporarily disabled worker is entitled to live a full
life. However, the court may have advanced the benign purposes of the Act at
the cost of stoking the adversarial fire.
IV. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
State ex rel. Osburn v. Cole, 319 S.E.2d 364 (W.' Va. 1983).
Lough v. Cole, 310 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 1983).
Like the Workers' Compensation Act, unemployment compensation legisla-
tion is remedial in nature." Accordingly, the court will liberally construe a statutory
ambiguity in favor of the claimant. 4 However, when the meaning of a statute is
7 A. LARSON, LARSON's ,oRKMEN'S COMPENSATION (desk ed. 1984).
Id. at 3-137.
69 Wilson, No. 15990, slip op. at 8.
70 Id. (citing Schaefer v. Williamston Comrmunity Schools, 117 Mich. App. 26, 323 N.W.2d 577
(1982)).
Id. at 9 (citing Grable v. Weyerhauser, 55 Or. App. 627, 639 P.2d 677 (1981)).
In regard to the third claimant, Jeffrey, the court concluded that his subsequent injury was
unrelated to the initial (compensable) injury.
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clear, it must be applied. Two cases reviewed during the survey period illustrate
these principles in the context of eligibility requirements. In the first case, Osburn
v. Cole, " the court rejected the assertion that eligibility requirements must be read
in light of a claimant's constitutional guarantees.
In Osburn, the court addressed an interesting question touching on the inter-
face between eligibility requirements and the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Rhonda L. Osburn had been receiving unemployment compensation
benefits for nine months when her activities outside the State became the subject
of a police investigation. Pursuant to a statutory requirement,76 Ms. Osburn was
required to report the name and location of any casual employer, as well as the
amount of wages earned. Although Ms. Osburn reported a four-day period of
employment during which she earned eighty dollars, she declined to reveal the name
or location of the employer, as she perceived that information to be. potentially
incriminating in regard to the police investigation. As a result of this gap in data,
her benefits were indefinitely suspended by the Department of Employment Security.
After a series of administrative and judicial decisions affirmed this suspension, Ms.
Osburn sought relief in the supreme court.
Osburn's argument, simply stated, was that an exception should be made to
"the general rule that the claimant has the burden of proving eligibility for
benefits"" when her privilege against self-incrimination would have to be sacrificed
to meet that burden. In rejecting this argument, the court denied the petitioner's
claim that she was being penalized for exercising her constitutional rights. To sup-
port its point, the court relied upon two lines of United States Supreme Court cases
which dealt with similar issues.
In one line of cases, the government sought to compel inherently incriminating
information, usually under a statute which provides a penalty for nondisclosure.
When it could be shown that if the information was disclosed it would provide
a prosecutor with a key element of a crime, the fifth amendment privilege rendered
the information requirement unenforceable.78 In the other line of cases, which the
court likened to Osburn's claim, the government sought neutral information as
part of an essentially noncriminal, regulatory scheme. In these cases, the reporting
requirement was upheld and the fifth amendment argument was rejected as an ex-
travagant application of the privilege.79
" Osburn v. Cole, 319 S.E.2d 364 (NV. Va. 1983).
76 W. VA. CODE § 21A-7-1 (1981) provides: "Claims for benefits shall be made in accordance
with rules and regulations prescribed by the commissioner."
7' Osburn, 319 S.E.2d at 366 (citing Thomas v. Rutledge, 280 S.E.2d 123 (W. Va. 1981)).
78 See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1963), where Grosso successfully argued that the
government could not force him to pay an excise tax imposed upon wagering for such payment would
effectively vitiate his fifth amendment privilege with respect to violation of gambling laws.
11 See United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927), where the defendant was ordered to file
income tax returns stating the amount of his earnings. Although the fifth amendment privilege did
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After reviewing these cases, the court concluded that Osburn's claim was unper-
suasive. There was no element of compulsion in the statutory information require-
ment; the Department of Employment Security was not seeking to secure
incriminating evidence but merely required the "information to warrant the con-
tinued payment of benefits." 8 The West Virginia Supreme Court synthesized several
tests used in the United States Supreme Court cases8 and adopted the following:
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by informa-
tion required to be furnished under State mandatory self-reporting systems which
are essential to the fulfillment of a regulatory statute where (1) the information
sought is facially neutral; (2) the information required is directed at the public at
large and not to a selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities; (3) the
area of inquiry is essentially noncriminal and regulatory and not permeated with
criminal statutes; and (4) the possibility of incrimination is not substantial. "
The Osburn test appears fair and reasonable since the information needed for
the orderly and efficient operation of the state's regulatory programs is balanced
against the individual's claim to constitutional protection. Although the test adopted
will probably play a role in West Virginia jurisprudence generally, its impact upon
future cases within the realm of unemployment compensation is likely to be limited.
Of potentially greater impact, however, is the court's decision in Lough v. Cole, 3
the second decision reviewed during the survey period.
The question presented in Lough was whether an employee, who left his employ-
ment to seek other work because the employer was in the process of going out
of business, is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits
under the provisions of the West Virginia Code.84 The claimant, Douglas Lough,
left his employment anticipating that his employer would soon cease doing business.
Less than thirty days later, Lough's previous employer did in fact go out of business.
Subsequently, Lough sought benefits for which he was ruled eligible but disqualified"
because his separation from employment was considered a "voluntary act of the
claimant" and one which did not "involve any fault on the part of the employer." '
The decision deeming the claimant disqualified for benefits was based on an inter-
SO Osburn, 319 S.E.2d at 369.
" See Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965), and California v. Byers,
402 U.S. 424 (1971).
32Osburn, 319 S.E.2d at 371.
Lough v. Cole, 310 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 1983).
14 Id. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3 (1981) provides, in pertinent part, that:
an individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (I) for the week in which he left his most
recent work voluntarily without good cause involving fault on the part of the employer afid
until the individual returns to covered employment and has been employed in covered employ-
ment at least thirty working days.
11 Lough, 310 S.E.2d at 493. The initial decision to disqualify the claimant was made by a deputy
of the Department of Employment Security.
,6 Id. at 493 n.4. The quoted passages are excerpts of the administrative law judge's decision,
which was affirmed by the board of review and the circuit court.
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pretation of West Virginia Code section 21A-6-3(1). 87 On appeal, the claimant re-
quested the court's interpretation of this statute.
Reversing the decision disqualifying the ciaimant, the court predicated its holding
on two familiar principles: The court can set aside mistaken conclusions of law
made by the Department of Employment Security;8 8 and unemployment compen-
sation statutes should be liberally construed in favor of the claimants.89 In its
analysis, the court drew upon decisions from other jurisdictions"0 which held that
an employee cannot be considered to have terminated his employment voluntarily
when his reason for quitting is that his employer is about to go out of business.
An important factual question in these cases was whether the job remained open
after the employee quit. The court applied this reasoning in construing the statute
governing disqualification" and concluded that Lough "did not leave his employ-
ment . . . voluntarily without good cause." 92
By applying the "liberality rule" the court in Lough expanded the right of
claimants to receive benefits under the provisions of the Compensation Act.
Although any advantage is susceptible to abuse, the court has advanced the pur-
pose of the Act93 in the Lough decision. For instance, an employee, whose employer
is about to go out of business, is now able to seek alternative employment before
his job is finally terminated and perhaps take advantage of favorable conditions
in the labor market.
V. COLLECTIVE BARGAIING AGREEMENTS
Local 598, Council 58, American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees v. City of Huntington, 317 S.E.2d 167 (W. Va. 1984).
Woodruff v. Board of Trustees of Cabell Huntington Hospital, 319 S.E.2d 372
(W. Va. 1984).
Recently, the court dealt with two cases regarding the enforceability of collec-
tive bargaining agreements in the public sector. In the first of these cases, a union
requested the court's vindication of its agreement, while in the second case, another
" See supra note 84.
" Lough, 310 S.E.2d at 433 (citing Kisamore v. Rutledge, 276 S.E.2d 821 (1981)).
,9 See Davis v. Hix, 140 W. Va. 398, 84 S.E.2d 404 (1954).
90 In support of its conclusion, the court cited the following cases: Kartridge-Pak Co. v. Johnson,
28 I11. 2d 616, 192 N.E.2d 867 (1963); Becote v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd.
of Rev., 18 Pa. Commw. 639, 339 A.2d 856 (1975); Anthony Adams AIA Architect v. Department
of Employment Sec., 139 Vt. 413, 430 A.2d 446 (1981); contra, Wilmington County Club v. Unemploy-
ment Ins. Appeal Bd., 301 A.2d 289 (Del. 1973).
9' W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(1) (1981), see supra note 84.
92 Lough, 310 S.E.2d at 495.
" The purpose of W. VA. CODE, ch. 21A, known as the "Unemployment Compensation Law,"
is set forth in W. VA. CODE § 21A-1-1 (1981), which provides: "The purpose of this chapter is to
provide reasonable and effective means for the promotion of social and economic security by reducing
as far as practicable the hazards of unemployment."
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union group raised a more involved constitutional question. In each case, the court
accepted the unions' arguments with alacrity.
In Local 598, Council 58, American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees v. City of Huntington,9" the court addressed the que.stion of whether
a municipality is empowered to enter into a collective bargaining agreement under
its statutory95 power to contract. In this case, three hundred sanitation workers
were represented by the union which had entered into the agreement with the city.
When the union workers demanded a pay increase pursuant to a parity clause9"
in the collective bargaining agreement, the city refused, claiming that "the agree-
ment was not legally binding." 97
In a brief opinion by Justice Neely, the court upheld the agreement as "binding
and enforceable." ' 98 In so doing, the court flatly rejected the contention that the
statute empowering the city to contract99 did not include the authority to enter
into a collective bargaining agreement.' Further, the court found unpersuasive
the argument that because the legislature had been unable to adopt a proposal
specifically allowing for such bargaining agreements, its inaction indicated
disapproval."' Moreover, the court bolstered its conclusion by pointing to the home
rule statute,' 2 which the court interpreted as providing municipalities with the
necessary power to incur such obligations.' 3 Additionally, the court noted similar
conclusions reached by another jurisdiction'" when faced with this question. Finally,
the court was not persuaded by an attorney general's opinion' 5 which indicated
that such agreements, on behalf of a 9ity, represented unlawful delegation of
,authority. If there was any doubt regarding whether a municipality is empowered
to enter into a collective bargaining agreement, it should be removed after Local 598.
Having ruled that collective bargaining agreements are generally valid, the court
next addressed questions touching on contractual limitations of employees' con-
" Local 598, Council 58, Am. Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. City of Hunt-
ington, 317 S.E.2d 167 (W. Va. 1984).
" W. VA. CODE § 8-12-1 (1969) provides, in part: "[E]very municipality shall have plenary power
and authority: . . . (2) to contract and be contracted with .... "
16 The parity clause provided that the sanitation workers would be paid at the same level as the
police and fire departments, which were also collective bargaining units with the city. "When the police
were given a raise, the sanitation workers demanded an equivalent pay raise pursuant to the contract."
Local 598, 317 S.E.2d at 168.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 169.
11 Id. (citing Dayton Teachers Assoc. v. Board of Educ., 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975)).
io Id. at 168.
101 The court stated: "The failure of the legislature to enact a particular law is not evidence that
the legislature rejected the policy underlying that bill." Id.
202 The "home rule" statute referred to by the court is W. VA. CODE § 8-12-2 (1969).
203 Local 598, 317 S.E.2d at 168.
304 See Dayton Teachers Assoc., 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714.
"' Op. Att'y Gen. No. 139 (W. Va. February 23, 1966).
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stitutional rights. In Woodruff v. Board of Trustees of Cabell Huntington
Hospital,'60 the issue presented was whether a municipality may restrain its employees
from exercising their first amendment rights through restrictive provisions in its
collective bargaining agreement. The management of Cabell Huntington Hospital
discharged fourteen of its union employees for distributing leaflets on the hospital
premises. These leaflets expressed concern regarding the management's proposal
to eliminate forty-three positions at the hospital. The hospital contended that this
activity was in violation of their collective bargaining agreement, which specifically
prohibited "any picketing or patrolling,"' 7 and therefore the discharges were
justified. The employees claimed that the group distribution of leaflets was a pro-
tected activity under state' 8 and federal'"9 constitutions, and therefore their
discharges represented state deprivation of these constitutional guarantees. Under
the court's original jurisdiction, the erilployees sought to compel their reinstate-
ment through an action in mandamus.
In an opinion by Justice McGraw," I the court initially dispensed with several
procedural questions. Since the Cabell Huntington Hospital was created by the
legislature in 1945 and its administration and management is vested in a Board
of Trustees appointed by the County Commission, the court concluded that the
hospital should be considered a public institution."' The court deemed that under
applicable state and federal labor management relation statutes,"' it should retain
jurisdiction over the dispute. Although the collective bargaining agreement pro-
vided for a nonbinding grievance procedure, the court considered the grievance
process inadequate and found that the extraordinary relief of mandamus was
appropriate.' With these procedural hurdles behind, the court moved on to the
constitutional questions posed.
The court relied on specific United States Supreme Court cases which held that
the group distribution of leaflets was a protected activity '4 under constitutional
106 Woodruff v. Board of Trustees of Cabell Huntington Hosp., 319 S.E.2d 372 (,V. Va. 1984).
107 Id. at 377.
W0, v. VA. CONST. art. III, §§ 7, 16.
00 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"a Neither Justice Neely nor Justice Harshbarger participated in this decision.
Compare with Justice Neely's rather extensive analysis of whether a county hospital should
be considered a'public institution in Orteza v. Monongalia County Gen. Hosp., 318 S.E.2d 40 (V.
Va. 1984), supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
"2 The statutes referred to by the court in reaching its conclusion were the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982), and the West Virginia Labor-Management Relations Act,
W. VA. CODE §§ 21-1A-1 to -8 (1981).
"' Supporting the court's conclusion is Cooper v. Gwinn, 298 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1981) (syllabus
point four): "While it is true that mandamus is not available where another specific and adequate
remedy exists, if such other remedy is not equally as beneficial, convenient and effective, mandamus
will lie." See also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Miller, 291 S.E.2d 673, 677 (W. Va. 1982). As
to what elements must generally coexist for an award of mandamus, see supra note 36.
"' Woodruff, 319 S.E.2d at 377 (citing Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 458 (1938)).
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free speech guarantees."1 5 The court emphasized that public employees, as citizens,
are entitled "to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the opera-
tion of the public [institutions] in which they work."' 16 Although the leaflets con-
tained comments regarding the relationship between the hospital and the union,
they also contained information regarding the quality of health care as affected
by the proposed job eliminations, a public issue; therefore, the activity remained
constitutionally protected." I 7
After describing the relevant dimensions of constitutional protection, the court
turned to the crux of the hospital's argument. It argued since the collective bargaining
agreement prohibited picketing and patrolling, the union members had thereby
waived their free speech fights. In response, the court cogently rejected this claim
of waiver as it applied to either the state or federal constitution. With regard to
the United States Constitution, the court stated that the test for determining the
existence of a waiver in the free speech context turns on whether the words indicating
waiver are "clear and compelling." Recognizing that the terms "picketing or patroll-
ing" were not defined in the agreement,'"9 the court found such terms inherently
vague'2 ° and insufficient to constitute a clear and competing waiver of petitioners'
right to distribute leaflets.' 2' Furthermore, the court believed that any prohibitions
against picketing or patrolling were in reference to activities associated with a strike
or slowdown. 122
Importantly, the court read the state constitution as providing more extensive
protection of fundamental rights than does the federal constitution. Pointing to
article III, section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution, 23 the court concluded that
the alleged waiver was improper since "members of society may not by contract
divest themselves"'12 of fundamental rights. The court emphasized that even if the
agreement had contained a sufficiently precise waiver of fundamental rights, it would
remain unconstitutional unless the hospital could "show a substantial relationship
Id. (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
Id. (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
"" See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (nonpolitical
speech protected); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (information concerning labor disputes
protected).
" Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, '327 (1937), rev'd on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)). Accord Con-
solidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 537 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1976).
" Woodruff, 319 S.E.2d at 380.
220 See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 100-01.
2I Woodruff, 319 S.E.2d at 381.
122 Id.
'21 Article III, § 1 of the West Virginia Constitution provides:
All men are, by nature, equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of
which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest
their posterity, namely: the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and
possessing property, and of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
'" Woodruff, 319 S.E.2d at 379.
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to a compelling state interest under" the West Virginia Constitution.1 2 5 Thus, the
court held: "[U]nder article III, [sections one, seven, and sixteen] of the West Virginia
Constitution, collective bargaining agreements in the public sector may not contain
provisions abrogating employees' fundamental constitutional rights, including the
rights of expression, assembly, association, and petition."' 6 In so doing, the court
found that the discharged workers had been impermissibly terminated and ordered
their reinstatement with back pay by granting the writ of mandamus.
The court's Local 598 decision sanctions the use of collective bargaining
agreements in the public sector generally, while the Woodruff decision represents
a limitation on a particular use of such an agreement. Although these cases seem
to be well within the court's traditional function of determining each party's respec-
tive rights, the court might be embarking on a new path. As the court noted in
Local 598, the legislature has not spoken in regard to the use of public collective
bargaining agreements.' 2 7 In the absence of legislation the court can substantially
reshape the terms of such agreements as long as a colorable constitutional argu-
ment can be made. Had the employees in Woodruff raised a procedural due process
argument regarding their dismissal rather than their persuasive first amendment
argument, the court may have found itself tangled in questions better left to the
democratic process. For it is by now axiomatic that the question of how much
process is due is answered by a balancing of costs. Moreover, one would reasonably
expect public collective bargaining legislation to answer which of the many quasi-
state agencies should be covered by such agreements. For the time being, the answer
will depend, in some part, on the court's discretion in determining when "state
action" stems from the use of collective bargaining agreements.' 2 8
VI. DISCRIMINATION
Shepardstown Volunteer Fire Department v. State ex rel. West Virginia Human
Rights Commission, 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983).
In Shepardstown Volunteer Fire Department v. State ex rel. West Virginia
Human Rights Commission,'2 9 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals pro-
vided guidance in the application of "Title VII analysis"'' 30 to actions involving
discriminatory treatment of individuals. The Shepardstown decision represents not
only a choice of what law will apply, but a pattern of how it should be applied.
This decision liberally construed the provisions of the West Virginia Human Rights
Id. at 381 n.4.
126 Id. at 379.
'27 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
'21 See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
"' Shepardstown Volunteer Fire Dep't v. State ex rel. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 309 S.E.2d
342 (W. Va. 1983).
,30 "Title VII analysis" refers to the body of case law which has arisen in the federal court system
since the adoption of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1983).
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Act,13' and strictly defined the standard of judicial review of administrative agency
decisions.
The Shepardstown decision arose from the consolidation of two separate but
factually similar cases in which groups of women, after being denied membership
in their local volunteer fire departments (hereinafter "Departments"), asserted that
they had been unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of their gender. In
both cases, the women filed charges with the West Virginia Human Rights Com-
mission (hereinafter "Commission"), claiming that the Departments were "place[s]
of public accommodations,"' 32 and were thereby subject to the provisions of the
state Human Rights Act. The Commission, after hearings, agreed with these claims
and, as part of a remedial action, ordered the Department to install the female
applicants as full members.'13 Pursuant to statute,134 the Departments sought judicial
review of the Commission's orders, and in both cases the circuit courts held that
the Departments were not "place[s] of public accommodations," and therefore not
subject to the provisions of the Act. On appeal, the court reversed the circuit court
decisions and reinstated the orders of the Commission.
Justice McHugh, writing for a unanimous court, first addressed the question
of the statutory definition of a "place of public accommodation." The appellees
argued that the West Virginia Human Rights Act was patterned after the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and that the definition of places of public accommodation should
therefore be limited to inns, hotels, motels, restaurants, theaters, and other such
establishments. The court reaffirmed its commitment to broadly and liberally con-
strue the meaning of the Act 32 so as to best fulfill its humanitarian purposes.",
Noting that this precise issue appeared to be one of first impression, the court
reviewed cases outside our jurisdiction and gleaned the critical factors relevant in
determining whether a volunteer fire department should be subject to civil rights
legislation. The court utilized the following factors in determining whether the
Departments should be properly considered "place[s] of public accommodations":
Statutory and municipal regulation; public funding; public solicitation of funds;
the holding of events open to the public; and nominal membership dues in com-
parison to annual expenditures. 37 Recognizing that both Departments possessed
3' W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1, 5-11-19 (1979).
131 W. VA. CODE § 5-11-30) (1979) provides the following definition: "The term 'place of public
accommodations' means any establishment or person, as defined herein, including the State, or any
political or civil subdivision thereof, which offers its services, goods, facilities or accommodations to
the general public, but shall not include any accommodations which are in their nature private . .. ."
"3 The Commission further ordered the Departments to cease and desist further discriminatory
practices and to implement a specified "affirmative action program." Additionally, each town's mayor
or council, as well as the Departments' officers, were required to file periodic sworn statements of
compliance with the Commission for two years following the date of the order.
"' See W. VA. CODE § 29A-5-4(a) (1980).
"' See Currey v. State Human Rights Comm'n, 273 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1980); State Human Rights
Comm'n v. Pauley, 212 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1975). See also W. VA. CODE § 5-11-15 (1980).
,36 W. VA. CODE § 5-11-2 (1980).
,3' Shepardstown, 309 S.E.2d at 349-50.
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many of these attributes, the court concluded that they were "quasi-governmental
bodies"' 38 and, therefore, within the statutory definition.'39
Troubled by the bases upon which the circuit courts had reversed the Human
Rights Commission's orders, 4 ' the court quoted the proper standards of judicial
review of a contested case under the West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act.'
The court then emphasized that should a circuit court perceive defects not within
the statutory standards for reversal, vacation, or modification, it may either "af-
firm the order or decision of the agency or remand the case for further
proceedings."' 142 By circumscribing narrow grounds for reversal, the court has left
with the Commission the determination of whether an unlawful discriminatory prac-
tice has occurred.
In the Shepardstown opinion, the court has enabled litigants to better focus
upon the discriminatory treatment issue by adopting the evidentiary framework
outlined by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green 43 and its progeny."'4 This framework provides a method by which the evidence
can be organized so as to simplify the burden of proof in discrimination lawsuits.
Accordingly, in actions "to redress unlawful discriminatory practices in employ-
ment [as well as] access to 'places[s] of public accommodations' "45 our court has
held:
[T]he burden is upon the complainant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
a prima facie case of discrimination, which burden may be carried by showing
3' Id. at 350.
Id. at 351.
Z,0 In both instances the circuit courts determined that the Departments were not "place[s of
public accommodations" and thereby not subject to the Act; therefore, the female applicants were
not victims of unlawful discrimination.
"'1 W. VA. CODE § 29A-5-4(g) (1980) provides:
The [circuit] court may affirm the order or decision of the agency or remand the case for
further proceedings. It shall reverse, vacate or modify the order or decision of the agency
if the substantial rights of the petitioner or petitioners have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, decision or order are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedures; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwar-
ranted exercise of discretion.
"z Shepardstown, 309 S.E.2d at 351.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
" See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 103 S. Ct. 1478 (1983); Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Board of Trustees of Keene State College
v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273 (1976).
"4 Shepardstown, 309 S.E.2d at 352.
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(1) that the complainant belongs to a protected group under the statute; (2) that
he or she applied and was qualified for the position or opening; (3) that he or
she was rejected despite his or her qualifications; and (4) that after the rejection,
respondent continued to accept the applications of similarly qualified persons. If
the complainant is successful in creating this rebuttable presumption of discrimina-
tion, the burden then shifts to the respondent to offer some legitimate and non-
discriminatory reason for the rejection. Should the respondent succeed in rebutting
the presumption of discrimination, then the complainant has the opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the respon-
dent were merely a pretext for the unlawful discrimination.'6
Several aspects of this evidentiary relationship warrant comment. First, the
nature of the rebuttable presumption created by the prima facie case is one which
"[i]f the trier of fact believes the [complainant's] evidence, and if the [respondent]
is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the
[complainant] because no issue of fact remains in the case."' 14 However, as the
court aptly noted, the burden of persuasion never shifts but remains with the com-
plainant at all times. 48 The intermediate burden which the respondent must carry
to rebut the prima facie case is merely one of producing legally sufficient evidence.
This evidence need only raise "a genuine issue of fact as to whether [the respon-
dent] discriminated against [the complainant]."' 4 Although the respondent need
only articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation to rebut the presump-
tion, there exists a strong incentive for him to persuade the trier of fact that his
proffered reasons did, in fact, motivate the rejection. If the prima facie case is
rebutted, the legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption "drops from the case," ISO
"and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity."'is
At this new level, the complainant must show that the reasons proffered by
the respondent were not the true reasons for her rejection. To succeed, the com-
plainant must persuade the trier of fact "that she had been the victim of an inten-
tional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."'
The Shepardstown decision warrants recognition for it furnished the state's
civil rights practitioners the wealth of federal precedential guidance surrounding
Title VII. As regards discrimination claims involving a "place of public accom-
modation," the court's broad statutory interpretation of that phrase provides the
state litigant more protection than under existing federal law.'" By rejecting the
146 Id.
" Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
141 Shepardstown, 309 S.E.2d at 352.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
So Id. at 255 n.10.
SI Id. at 255.
Id. at 256.
"' See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
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rigid and compartmentalized federal definition of "place[s] of public accommoda-
tion," the court should be commended for giving credence to the benign policies
supporting the West Virginia Human Rights Act.
Raymond Parker
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